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Introduction
ax treaties generally require that signatories eliminate
“double taxation” through the extension of either foreign
tax credits, or exemptions for foreign source income (“FSI”) by
each country to its own residents, which the other country taxes
on a source basis. The treaties also commonly seek to address
“fiscal evasion.” While this term only denotes illegal tax avoid-
ance, some commentators discern a broader policy goal, embod-
ied in the international tax regime, which includes the treaty
network of avoiding “double non-taxation,”1 or the creation of
“stateless income”2 that is not taxed anywhere.
Put these two concerns together and you arguably have a “sin-
gle tax principle,”3 holding that each increment of a multina-
tional taxpayer’s global income should be subject to tax some-
where exactly once, rather than either zero times or twice. For
* Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, NYU Law School. I am grateful to
the Filomeno D’Agostino Research Fund for financial support, to Steven Dean
and Fadi Shaheen for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and for partici-
pants’ comments at “Reconsidering the Tax Treaty,” a symposium held at
Brooklyn Law School on October 23, 2015.
1. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle: An Essay
on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 305 (2014).
2. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless Income, 65 TAX L.
REV. 99 (2011).
3. See, e.g., REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 59–65 (2015).
T
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convenience, this article will refer to double taxation as depart-
ing from the single tax principle on the “upside” and to double
nontaxation as departing from it on the “downside.”
When one focuses on exactly how many times a given incre-
ment of global income is taxed, one risks exalting formalism at
the expense of substance. As noted elsewhere about double tax-
ation, treating its elimination as a core principle
confuses two distinct questions [about the taxation of cross-bor-
der activity]. The first is ‘Howmuch?’ The second is ‘Howmany
times?’ . . . [W]hile there may be good reason to care about high
versus low taxes on cross-border activity . . . this does not imply
that there is any direct normative reason to care about the
number of taxes that are being levied on a given taxpayer or
transaction. After all, most of us would rather be taxed twenty
times at a 1 percent rate each time than once at 35 percent.4
While being taxed twice need not necessarily be worse than
being taxed once, depending on the circumstances, the same
point does not hold on the downside. Since zero multiplied by
anything is zero, being taxed zero times cannot help but result
in a lower tax liability than being taxed some positive amount
once. For this simple arithmetical reason, the single tax princi-
ple operates differently in the two settings. On the upside, it can
confuse and misdirect the analysis, while unduly limiting the
design choices that are deemed available. By contrast, on the
downside, it properly tees up an issue of genuine importance to
international tax policy debate pertaining to stateless income5—
although it leaves much to be said regarding whether, when, and
why one should object to businesses paying tax nowhere rather
than somewhere.
If one accepts these conclusions about the single tax principle,6
what are the implications for tax treaties’ future role in the de-
4. DANIEL SHAVIRO, FIXINGU.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 6–7 (2014).
5. If the single tax principle were viewed as being satisfied on the down-
side, even when income was taxed at a rate of, for example, 0.0001 percent, the
resulting formalism would greatly reduce the principle’s usefulness. In prac-
tice, however, it seems to be interpreted as requiring that the tax rate not be
too close to zero. This can create a line-drawing issue that raises broader ques-
tions about the underlying reasons for the single tax principle. However, this
issue has not arisen much in practice.
6. One could perhaps reformulate the single tax principle as requiring that
income be taxed at either the residence country rate or the source country rate,
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velopment of international tax law and policy? Although in dis-
tinct ways, this article assesses the implications both on the up-
side and the downside as mainly negative. On the upside, while
treaties surely can continue to play a constructive role in peer
countries’ efforts to coordinate the interactions between their tax
systems, their focus on double taxation can potentially be mis-
leading—although this article will argue that, in practice, there
may be a greater scope for interpretive flexibility than has often
been assumed. On the downside, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (BEPS) process7 helps to show that a multilat-
eral, not just bilateral process (as with treaties), is imperative
insofar as countries decide that they want to address stateless
income.
I. UPSIDEDEPARTURES FROM THE SINGLE TAX PRINCIPLE
Suppose the United States was choosing between (a) taxing all
of its resident multinationals’ FSI at the same 35 percent rate
that it imposes on domestic source corporate income, without
any deferral for its foreign subsidiaries’ FSI, but with foreign tax
credits, and (b) treating foreign taxes as merely deductible, but
substantially lowering the tax rate for FSI. Under option (b), un-
like option (a), U.S. companies with FSI would formally be sub-
ject to double taxation. Yet, option (b) would result in imposing
without regard to how many times it is taxed. Indeed, this might help explain
why levying both residence country and source country taxes on the same in-
come is deemed permissible under the single tax principle if the former offer
foreign tax credits. (The alternative explanation of its consistency with the sin-
gle tax principle would be that credits effectively negate the source country
tax, as far as the taxpayer is concerned.) If the single tax principle were thus
reformulated, however, it would effectively amount to arguing for following ei-
ther capital export neutrality (which calls for applying the residence country
rate) or capital import neutrality (which calls for applying the source country
rate). Setting aside the oddity of one’s indifference to which of these two rival
principles is followed, which has been discussed elsewhere where the author
views both, along with other “single-bullet” global welfare norms, such as cap-
ital ownership neutrality, as normatively unpersuasive and unhelpful. See
SHAVIRO, supra note 4, at 14–16; Daniel Shaviro, The Crossroads Versus the
Seesaw: Getting a “Fix” on Recent International Tax Policy Developments 4–5
(N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 15-20, 2000).
7. SeeORG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION&DEV. [OECD], ACTIONPLANONBASE
EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).
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lower U.S. taxes on FSI than option (a), in any instance where,
given the applicable source-based foreign rate, the U.S. tax rate
for the FSI was lower than the “burden-neutral deduction tax
rate.”8
For example, suppose a U.S. company earned $100 of FSI in a
country with a 20 percent corporate rate, and that under option
(b) the U.S. tax rate for FSI was 15 percent. Given the existing
35 percent U.S. corporate rate, absent deferral, the company
would owe $15 of U.S. tax under option (a), as opposed to just
$12 under option (b) (i.e., 15 percent of the after-foreign-tax
amount of $80). In such an instance, “the ‘crime’ of double taxa-
tion [under option (b)] would evidently be victimless.”9
When deciding how to tax resident companies’ FSI, there are
two main reasons why a country might prefer option (b) to option
(a). First, treating foreign taxes as merely deductible induces
resident taxpayers to treat foreign taxes as a cost like any other.
This is unilaterally optimal, unless there is more to the story,
given that home country individuals do not get to spend the for-
eign tax revenues.10 By contrast, 100 percent foreign tax credits,
if provided immediately and without limitation, offer a 100 per-
cent marginal reimbursement rate (“MRR”) for foreign taxes
paid, thereby potentially eliminating resident taxpayers’ cost
consciousness with respect to foreign tax liabilities.11
Second, option (b), leaving open the question of what tax rate
should apply to resident companies’ FSI, allows countries to de-
cide how lightly or heavily they want to tax such FSI. By con-
trast, option (a) requires that this depend on the relationship
between the domestic corporate tax rate and source countries’
rates. Given the distinct issues that may govern the choices of
domestic corporate tax rate and that for resident companies’
FSI12 (for example, tax elasticity at different margins), there is
8. Kimberly Clausing & Daniel Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral Shift from For-
eign Tax Creditability to Deductibility?, 64 TAX L. REV. 431, 435 (2011). For
example, the burden-neutral U.S. tax rate for FSI is 18.8% if the foreign rate
is 20% and 13.3% if the foreign rate is 25%. See id. at 436.
9. SHAVIRO, supra note 4, at 5–6.
10. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 20–22. As discussed infra, what this article
calls call “tagging” considerations, however, may support extending worse-
than-deductible, albeit better-than-creditable, treatment to resident taxpay-
ers’ foreign tax liabilities.
11. See id. at 8–9.
12. See id. at 9–18.
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no reason to think that requiring the two rates to travel in tan-
dem—or having domestic tax burdens on FSI depend on foreign
countries’ tax levels—is optimal.13
In addition to having clear advantages from a residence coun-
try standpoint, option (b) is not necessarily disadvantageous to
source countries. To be sure, such countries might prefer that
the residence country offer foreign tax credits to its companies,
thus reducing the companies’ aversion to paying the source coun-
try taxes. Yet, the single tax principle unambiguously permits
residence countries to exempt FSI, a deductibility-equivalent re-
sult for such taxes14 that results in a domestic MRR of zero for
such taxes.
A fuller account of why a given country might benefit from (1)
taxing resident companies’ FSI at a rate between zero and the
full domestic tax rate, and (2) offering worse-than-deductible,
but better-than-creditable MRRs for such companies’ foreign tax
liabilities, has been offered elsewhere.15 This does pose the ques-
tion, however, of whether this would require violating bilateral
tax treaties that commit the signatories to adhere on the upside
to the single tax principle. A recent prominent international tax
reform proposal helps to show that the answer to this question
is probably not.
In September 2013, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee, un-
der then-Chairman Max Baucus, released a Staff Discussion
Draft that sketched out alternative international tax reform op-
tions.16 One of the main two options that this document de-
scribed, called “Option Z,” would apply as follows to certain FSI
of U.S. multinationals. A percentage of each dollar of such FSI
would be fully taxable to the U.S. parent, while the remaining
increment of the dollar would be exempt. Foreign tax credits
13. To be sure, the single tax principle permits one to exempt resident com-
panies’ FSI instead of granting foreign tax credits. However, this also limits
discretion and may be below the preferred rate. See id. In addition, while under
a worldwide/foreign tax credit system, one can use deferral to lower both the
effective domestic tax rate for FSI and the marginal reimbursement rate for
foreign taxes, which has adverse effects of its own. See id. at 22–26.
14. See id. at 9.
15. See Shaviro, supra note 6.
16. See Summary of Staff Discussion Draft: International Business Tax Re-
form, U.S. SENATECOMMITTEE ONFIN. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.finance.sen-
ate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman%27s%20Staff%20International%20Discus-
sion%20Draft%20Summary.pdf.
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would be allowed as to the taxable component, but not the ex-
empt component of each dollar of such FSI.
As an illustration, suppose that the taxable percentage of such
FSI was 60 percent. If the U.S. domestic corporate tax rate re-
mained at 35 percent, this would mean that, in effect, each dollar
of the FSI would be taxable at a 21 percent rate (i.e., 60 percent
of the tax rate for domestic source income). The MRR for foreign
taxes paid with respect to this FSI would be 60 percent.17
It is highly likely that Option Z avoids violating bilateral tax
treaties. After all, for every dollar of FSI earned by a U.S. mul-
tinational and taxed abroad, double taxation is avoided as to the
taxable component of that dollar via foreign tax creditability,
and, as to the remaining component, through exemption. Thus,
there is formal compliance with the bar on double taxation, if
one is willing to accept bifurcation for purposes of the analysis.18
There also is a strong purposive argument in favor of allowing
such bifurcation. Suppose, for example, one views the bar on
double taxation as being meant to address the concern that coun-
tries are inclined to overburden cross-border activity. Thus, one
must mitigate this concern by offering exemption or foreign tax
credits. However, if each of these two mitigation methods is per-
missible, then arguably there is nothing wrong with Option Z’s
mix-and-match approach, given that one cannot actually reduce
the overall mitigation that is provided.19
The point can be made more generally as follows: under an Op-
tion Z-style approach, the MRR equals the ratio between the tax
rate on FSI and the tax rate on domestic source income. Simpli-
fied even further, so long as theMRR equals or exceeds the above
ratio between the tax rates on FSI and domestic source income,
one does not violate the single tax principle by combining a MRR
that is below 100 percent MRR with a tax rate on FSI that is
greater than zero.
There admittedly is room here for interpretive ambiguity. For
example, if not all FSI and/or not all domestic source income is
taxed the same, or if there are systematic tax base differences
17. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 45–46.
18. See Fadi Shaheen, How Reform-Friendly Are U.S. Tax Treaties, 41
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1243 (2016) (arguing in detail that Option Z is treaty-con-
sistent).
19. See id. (arguing that even if Option Z violated bilateral tax treaties, sig-
natories would have little motivation to object, given that it does not harm
them, and may even be preferable from their standpoint to exemptions).
2016] The Two Faces of the Single Tax Principle 1299
between the domestic tax treatment of the two types of income,
then testing for compliance with the above rule may potentially
involve controversy. In a simple and straightforward case that
lacks these issues, however, the comparison can simply be based
on applicable marginal tax rates.
Is this a radical new approach to interpreting the single tax
principle? The answer clearly is no. In particular, consider U.S.
Internal Revenue Code section 965, enacted in 2004, which pro-
vides a temporary repatriation tax holiday. This provision com-
bined, (a) making qualifying foreign dividends, in effect, 85 per-
cent excludable, with (b) reducing allowable foreign tax credits
by the same ratio.20 Similar adjustments may apply to other
items of FSI that are partly excludable or taxed at special low
rates.21
Allowing interpretive nuance with respect to the bar on double
taxation might provide for criticism, because a significant risk
may exist in regards to opening the door for the imposition by
treaty signatories of excessive tax burdens on cross-border eco-
nomic activity. However, one could easily exaggerate countries’
unilateral predilection to target such activity for heavy tax bur-
dens. As suggested by the recent movement toward exemption
in countries such as the United Kingdom and Japan, pressures
of tax competition, plus an eagerness to help home-country cor-
porate “champions” compete with their overseas business rivals,
frequently outweigh the urge to maximize domestic tax reve-
nues, and thus reduce the need to keep formal legal barriers in
place.
II. DOWNSIDEDEPARTURES FROM THE SINGLE TAX PRINCIPLE
Why object to stateless income, or income that is taxed zero
times rather than once? The question is harder and more com-
plicated than it may initially seem. From the unilateral national
welfare standpoint of a given country, foreign taxes are just a
cost. Thus, suppose a U.S. company, owned by U.S. individuals,
can pay taxes of either €10 million or zero on its operations in
20. See I.R.C. § 965(d) (2004). It is true, however, that this provision applied
to taxpayers electively, rather than mandatorily.
21. For example, U.S. taxpayers must take account of rate differentials be-
tween ordinary income and particular categories of capital gain in applying the
foreign tax credit limitations of Code section 904. See Treas. Reg. § 1.904(b)-1
(2004).
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the European Union without any effect either on its level of U.S.
investment or on its U.S. tax liability (depending solely on
whether the U.S. rules discourage it from engaging in EU tax
planning). This might turn, for example, on whether the com-
pany can use the U.S. check-the-box rules to shift taxable income
from high-tax EU countries into tax havens, without thereby in-
curring U.S. tax liability under subpart F of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.22
In this scenario, there is little or no reason for the United
States to object unilaterally to the company’s creation of state-
less income. Nonetheless, both the United States under subpart
F, and various exemption countries, under their own controlled
foreign corporation rules, often tax resident companies’ FSI
when it either has been reported as arising in a tax haven, or is
of a kind that seems likely to end up in a haven.23 Similar con-
cerns appear to underlie the OECD’s BEPS project.
As has been argued elsewhere that this reflects countries’ of-
ten having
good reason for disfavoring high levels of actual or suspected
foreign tax minimization. Income that is reported as arising in
a tax havenmay be unlikely to have been earned there econom-
ically, given that havens often have limited productive capac-
ity. In addition, as a matter of successful tax planning, shifting
reported income so that it arises outside of the domestic tax
base, even if it initially shows up in a foreign jurisdiction, with
a significant tax rate, in which one has boots (so to speak) on
the ground, often is merely a first step towards further on-shift-
ing it to a tax haven. Thus, it is reasonable for countries to use
the fact that income has been reported as arising in a tax haven
– or is of a kind that seems likely to end up in a tax haven – as
a “tag” indicating an increased likelihood that it was actually
earned at home.24
To be sure, countries’ aversion to overseas tax avoidance is not
continuous and ongoing. In the United States, for example, the
government has tolerated U.S. companies’ use of check-the-box
rules to avoid subpart F’s checks on avoidance of other countries’
taxes, which arguably reflects the view that the United States
22. Subpart F refers to I.R.C. §§ 951–965.
23. See Shaviro, supra note 6, at 20–21.
24. Id. at 20.
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benefits, rather than loses, from such activity.25 Considerable
variation in countries’ tolerance of, or hostility to, overseas tax
avoidance should come as no surprise, given the underlying am-
biguity (and likely heterogeneity) of the domestic national wel-
fare effects.
Accordingly, with respect to downside departures from the sin-
gle tax principle, outcomes that matter substantively, not just
formally, are indeed at stake, however, the principle fails to illu-
minate why, whether, and when countries should actually find
it objectionable. In addition, insofar as it wishes to address it,
the OECD’s BEPS process is a rich testament to the likely need
to proceed multilaterally, rather than through unilateral or bi-
lateral treaty network options. We will learn more in the next
few years regarding just how successful (or not) this process
turns out to be. In any event, however, it clearly reflects a wide-
spread judgment that the traditional treaty structure is not ad-
equately equipped to meet new challenges.
CONCLUSION
In assessing the single tax principle, which arguably underlies
bilateral tax treaties, one should distinguish between upside de-
partures, which occur when the same dollar of income is taxed
more than once, and downside departures, which occur when it
is not taxed at all. This article argues that a focus on barring
upside departures can be quite misguided. While overtaxing
cross-border activity relative to that occurring in one country
may be undesirable, this should not stand in the way of letting
residence countries tax foreign source income at a reduced rate
in lieu of wholly offsetting source country taxes via foreign tax
credits. As for barring downside departures from the single tax
principle, such as by addressing stateless income, this often is
desirable from a given country’s unilateral national welfare
standpoint (and is even more clearly worth pursuing multilater-
ally), yet the issues raised are more complicated than what ad-
herence to the single tax principle appears to suggest.
25. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, BEPS Conference at Bocconi University in Mi-
lan (May 21, 2014), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2014/05/beps-conference-
at-bocconi-university.html (noting that many European tax policy commenta-
tors view the U.S. check-the-box rules in this way).
